Police Department under Fire by Gabrielson, W. A.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 33 | Issue 1 Article 12
1942
Police Department under Fire
W. A. Gabrielson
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Criminology is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
W. A. Gabrielson, Police Department under Fire, 33 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 76 (1942-1943)
A POLICE DEPARTMENT UNDER FIRE
W. A. Gabrielsont
At 7:53 a.m. Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, a call came in
over the switchboard of the Honolulu Police Department which
jarred the monotony of the skeleton Sunday staff at the Station into
electrified activity. "I'm eating breakfast in the parlor with my
family," reported Thomas Fujimoto, who lives in the Damon Tract
near Pearl Harbor, "and a bomb just struck my kitchen. They're
bombing all Pearl Harbor." A call to the Pearl City Branch of the
Police Department, verified the fantastic report. Instantaneously
the Police switchboard was jammed with calls reporting falling
bombs with their aftermath of death, fire, and destruction.
Thus began the story of the first aerial bombardment of an
American city. America has been at war before, but wars of the
past-where the civilians received news of the war by dispatches
from a front which was across the ocean-seem pedestrian in con-
trast with lightning war from the air which soldier and civilian
must face side by side.
The story of Honolulu and its Police Department under aerial
siege is exciting and worth telling, not as a reminiscence of a past
event, but as a recorded illustration of the problems which police
departments of other American cities may be required to face and
deal with before this total war is over. It is hoped that the reading
of this record may be of value to other police departments in organ-
izing themselves for maximum service and efficiency, and may help
them to strengthen in advance what appear as weak links in their
chain of defense.
The Police Department of the City and County of Honolulu is
the civilian law enforcement agency for the Island of Oahu. Oahu
has an area of about 598 square miles and a population of 258,258.
During normal, and even during boom times, law enforcement on
Oahu is not particularly difficult by mainland standards. Problems
arising incident to the presence of large numbers of sailors and
soldiers come under the jurisdiction of the Shore Patrol and the
Military Police, respectively. Oahu has no organized gangs and
few first degree murders. On an island the size of Oahu a successful
auto theft is impossible unless the thief also steals a boat to escape
with his loot. Honolulu itself sprawls over a narrow coastal plane,
creeps up a dozen narrow valleys, and clambers over steeply rising
hills. Like Topsy, it just grew, as did its roads and highway, and
consequently, the traffic problem was the Police Department's chief
headache. And of course even "Paradise" has no immunity from
burglars and petty thieves.
tghief, Police Department, City and County of Honolulu, T. H.
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In Hawaii, as on the mainland, war with Japan has long been
"an old street rumor." But with the world situation growing more
tense day by day, the Police Department could not afford to take the
chance that rumor would never become reality. Consequently, in
the spring of 1941 plans were made for the forming of an emergency
police reserve which could, if the necessity arose, supplement the
regular force. This reserve consisted of 150 leading business men,
lawyers, executives, legislators, and others.
On July 27, 1941, a school to train these reserves began. Classes
were held every Monday night from 7:00 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. at which
the men were taught the laws of arrest, the duties of a police officer,
beat problems, how to gather evidence in traffic accidents, first aid,
self defense, and the handling of firearms. In addition to the weekly
class, these reserves walked or rode a beat with a police officer one
night a week learning the location of persons living in that area.
These reserves graduated at the end of November, 1941.
On December 7, the Honolulu Police Department, because of
these newly graduated reserves, had in addition to its 325 regular
officers 150 trained men ready to be called.
The organization of the Honolulu Police Department on Decem-
ber the 7th was somewhat as follows. Besides the Chief of Police
there were, in what might be called the administrative end of the
Department, one assistant chief of police, an instructor for the
training school, and a supply officer. The duties of the Department
were divided into, and were handled by, seven regular divisions-
rural, traffic, vice, uniformed patrol, records, crime prevention, and
detection. Each division was commanded by a captain, and there
were in all ten lieutenants and twenty-nine sergeants. Three
watches were maintained on the uniformed patrol, each headed by
a lieutenant.
Fortunately, the first report of the bombing came in just at the
time the men on the first watch were signing off and the men on the
second watch were coming on. All other men on the force were
ordered to report immediately, and the Emergency Reserve was
called up. Getting word to the men was not an easy task. The sta-
tion switchboard was jammed with calls, as was a great portion
of the lines all over the city. The two-way police radio was used.
Messengers were sent. Announcements were made repeatedly over
the two local commercial broadcasting stations until they were
ordered off the air, directing officers to report to the station and tell-
ing civilians to stay off the streets, to stay in their houses, and not
to use their telephones except in cases of emergency.
Patrol cars were sent to all areas to keep traffic moving and to
maintain order. Guards were stationed at public utility installa-
tions. Officers were dispatched to areas that were being evacuated
to direct evacuation in an orderly fashion. Officers were sent to
W. A. GABRIELSON
help remove the dead and to care for the wounded and to get them
to first aid stations. The Fire Department was notified where bombs
fell so that they could check the spread of fire after explosions.
One of the most important tasks which the Police Department
had to perform was aiding the Federal Bureau of Investigation in
rounding up enemy aliens suspected of espionage. The Department
is particularly proud of its record in producing men wanted by the
F.B.I., sometimes within a few minutes after the Department's
assistance was called for.
Of course, many problems arose which had not, and some of
which could not have, been anticipated. This necessitated addi-
tional executive officers in our organization. Under peacetime con-
ditions a large number of executive officers were not needed. Now
they were urgently needed. Our duties had changed instantly from
crime prevention and detection to handling of crowds, answering
distress calls, giving emergency treatment, and moving injured and
dead. After martial law was declared, the Police Department was a
force that had to cooperate with the Military Police, but remained
as the Police Department. The Military Governor began issuing
orders, many of which were to be enforced by the civil police, and
the Chief of Police found himself so busy with the larger problems
that he realized he would have no time for the over-all planning and
direction of his force, unless this deficiency in executive officers was
remedied immediately.
Four new assistant chiefs were appointed from the Police De-
partment, and two civilian volunteers were given the rank of assist-
ant chief. The usual procedure of promotion according to rank was
not followed in the case of assistant chiefs selected from the force
because the captains were too valuable to take out of their jobs
and there were no trained men to replace them. Instead, four out-
standing younger men were picked for the new assistant chiefs-
two lieutenants, one detective, and one sergeant. The captains
realized the necessity which prompted the action, and so far as we
can determine, did not resent this temporary by-passing.
On December 7, we had no field officers of a higher rank than
sergeant. The captains and lieutenants all stayed at their inside
posts, except in cases of emergency assignment elsewhere. Two of
the new assistant chiefs were made field officers in general charge
of uniformed details, one being on duty during the day and the
other at night. Three were assigned to the Chief's outer office to
handle the detail work that previously passed across his desk, free-
ing him for general supervision both at headquarters, at our three
rural stations, and in the field with the men. There is an Assistant
Chief of Police on duty 24-hours a day at police headquarters, who
is empowered to make decisions immediately when the necessity
arises.
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Three new field lieutenants were selected, one for each watch,
and the number of sergeants was doubled.
100% performance in executive positions from men without spe-
cial training and experience in the special duties of the position can-
not be expected. We decided that the sooner we gave more of our men
posts of such responsibility, the more efficient we would become.
We did not know at the time of the first attack, and we do not know
now, when another enemy raid may come. We must, and do, go on
the assumption that it may come at any moment. During an attack
there may be casualties and deaths among the members of the
Department, and men must be ready and trained to fill every
position.
During the first 48 hours after the attack the whole force worked
almost constantly, being relieved only for a few hours of much
needed rest wherever the officer happened to be when it became
possible to relieve him. For the first month all officers were on duty
seven days a week, but now arrangements have been made for a
six-day week, because of the necessity of keeping our force at top
efficiency at all times.
Emergency posts have been created, and all officers are assigned
to a beat closest to their homes. In case of an air raid warning, all
men off duty have advance instructions where to report for specific
assignments. This system expedites mobilization and cuts down
traffic. Officers do not report to headquarters or police stations in
the three rural districts, Kaneohe, Wahiawa, or Pearl City, unless
those stations are their assigned posts.
In October of 1941 the Police Department had been authorized
by the legislature to increase its force from 262 to 367 men. We
immediately started recruiting to that level. The Military Governor
has since authorized the Police Department to increase its force by
an additional 200 men, and we are still recruiting to fulfill that
quota. We have to date added 141 regulars to our force since De-
cember 7th. We have in no way relaxed our pre-war requirements,
as now more than ever before, it is necessary to have capable,
responsible officers in our Department.
Before the war all recruits were put through a six weeks' train-
ing course. This we reluctantly abandoned because of the pressure
of time. The men we are recruiting now are given an intensive
one-week course-ten hours a day-with stress laid on handling of
firearms, riot duty and gas drill, and rudimentary police work. They
are then sent out with an experienced man to learn their job in the
field. In addition, we have a list of required reading which they
must complete and make reports on.
New equipment was needed and was ordered-a steel helmet, a
gas mask, and a riot gun for every man. Traffic officers and foot
patrolmen are not, of course, required to carry riot guns while on
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duty, but the guns are kept available at all times. In addition, the
Department has a reserve of 250 Army Springfield rifles. Thousands
of feet of rope were ordered for use in roping off bombed areas or
forbidden territory. Army stretchers were turned over to the De-
partment for use in evacuating hospitals or removing injured from
bombed buildings. Police officers have, of course, always been
equipped with first aid kits.
The motorized patrols were increased by 50% over the pre-war
levels. Each of these motor patrols is equipped with a two-way radio,
and as soon as 172 new sets that have been ordered arrive, all cars
owned and used by police reserves will also be equipped with two-
way radios. The two-way radio system has proved invaluable in
many ways during the emergency. It is particularly effective in
enforcing blackout regulations and curfews.
Our ordinary budget for 1942 was $1,025,000. We have been
granted an additional $1,200,000 to take care of our emergency
needs and increased staff.
This report would not be complete without special words of
commendation for those whose efforts helped the Department to
function efficiently during the first days of the war.
The Honolulu Police Commission deserves special mention. This
five-man commission is the policy-making body of the Department.
Its members are appointed by the Mayor of the City and County of
Honolulu and serve without pay. The present members of the Com-
mission are: Edward E. Bodge, Chairman, A. D. Castro, G. W.
Sumner, A. F. Thayer, and C. F. Weeber. Since the war, the com-
mission has devoted much time and energy to helping the Depart-
ment plan and function efficiently. Many of the members devoted
almost their full time to the department for many weeks after the
first attack and continue to donate a considerable portion of their
time to the Department.
The Police Emergency Reserve has been invaluable to the De-
partment. The businessmen in this Reserve have figuratively and
literally rolled up their sleeves and gone to work. When these
Reserves were asked to report on December 7, 1941, 140 out of the
150 then in the Reserves reported. The other ten were on the main-
land, and several of them have since returned and are also serving.
Most of them worked without rest or sleep for the first 24 hours.
Much of the work has been done at considerable cost to the business
pursuits of these men. They have served without pay, buy their
own uniforms, use their own cars, and are even paying for their
own radios, the cost of which is $282.00. The Department furnishes
their guns, helmets, masks, and Sam Browne belts. Since the blitz,
fifty more men have volunteered for the reserve, and there are now
200 Reserves in active service. The head of this Reserve is Major
Douglas King, a retired British Army officer, resident of the Terri-
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tory for many years. He volunteered with the first group in the
summer of 1941 and is now an Assistant Chief of Police, without
pay, devoting his full time to the task.
There is another new Assistant Chief of Police who is a volunteer
serving without pay. He had the unique experience on December
7th of having momentarily all to himself an escort of Japanese
bombers.
When the Japanese bombers descended on Pearl Harbor, Roy
Vitousek, one of Honolulu's leading lawyers, was in the air in a
private plane with his 16-year old son, Martin. They were flying in
the vicinity of Pearl Harbor over the John Rodgers airport, where
the Inter-Island planes land and take off. When he became aware of
the nationality of his uninvited escort, he climbed above the bombers
-one of whom fired a machine gun burst at his plane, but missed
-and circled above the bombers until the first wave passed after
which he made a dive landing on the field and sought what shelter
there was-in a hurry! He went immediately to Policd Headquar-
ters to report his experience, arriving at 8:30 a.m., and was
"drafted" into service. He has been here practically all the time
since. His assistance has been of immense value to the Chief and
the Department, particularly in helping to interpret the orders of
the Military Governor which the Police Department is called upon
to enforce and also in ironing out the legal questions that arose in
the new relationship of the Department with the Military Police
and the Shore Patrols under martial law.
Not only have the civilian police been allowed to continue func-
tioning under martial law, but their duties have multiplied in many
respects. Under the direction of the Military Governor they have
been called upon to enforce many of the orders issued by him. Many
"normal times" functions, on the other hand, have diminished.
Invocation of a dusk to dawn blackout, a 7:30 p.m. curfew on civil-
ian vehicle traffic and a 9:00 p.m. curfew on civilian pedestrians,
the ban on the sale of all alcoholic beverages, and gasoline rationing
have ushered in a new low in crime in Honolulu. Strict enforcement
of speed limits and the banning of night driving except for official
cars have cut traffic accidents by 50%. A stern Provost Court
Judge has dealt summarily with culprits arrested by the Police
Department. Most speeders have their driving licenses revoked.
Most of the summonses that are issued now are for blackout viola-
tions, curfew violations, and illegal parking. On many of the
through streets in Honolulu parking has been banned entirely, and
no parking is allowed on any street at night.
Many other civilian defense organizations have been formed or
have completed their organization since the beginning of the war.
The Department's closest contact is with the air raid wardens.
They have been helpful in reporting blackout and curfew violations
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and, in case of a raid, would cooperate with the police in evacuating
the civilian population, caring for injured and removing persons
from bombed buildings.
The war has on the whole greatly heightened public respect for
the Police Department. The reason for this is, we feel, that the
civilian population considers we have done a good job under diffi-
cult conditions. There are, however, two specific factors that have
contributed to this heightened respect and understanding.
The first is the Emergency Police Reserve. These business men,
with their inside view of the works and the problems of the Police
Department, have been able to promote a better understanding by
the civilian populace as a whole.
The second is the police radio. Shortly after the first attack
on December 7th, the commercial stations were ordered off the air.
Civilians who had been told to stay off the streets and off their
telephones felt completely isolated. When they flipped the dial on
their silent radios they discovered down at the end of the band at
1712 kilocycles the police broadcast. They remained glued to it.
The public got a bird's-eye view of the functioning of the Police
Department and an insight into the many tasks which policemen
are called upon to do. They heard policemen all over the city being
instructed to do various things-to pick up mothers about to give
birth and to take them to the hospital; to check for blackout viola-
tions and suspicious characters; to pick up blood donors; to report
for specific assignments; to investigate what somebody thought
might be signal lights (which turned out to be the reflection of the
moon on darkened windows); and all ofher things which a patrol
car on a beat is instructed to do.
They realized that the Police Department was busy protecting
and caring for the civilian population 24-hours a day. A flood of
calls came in from civilians who had coffee and food which they had
prepared for the men on their beat.
One dispatcher particularly became famous overnight. He was
Jimmy Wong, a Chinese-Hawaiian with a slow, deep, drawling
voice whose humor furnished many a person release from tension
through laughter.
As soon as the police realized the extent to which the public
was tuned in they reported news, told the population when the local
commercial stations were coming on the air for announcements,
and generally did everything they could to keep up public morale.
No public relations council in the world could have done for the
Police Department what the police broadcast did in increasing the
public's awareness of its functions and problems during those first
two days and nights when the radio was otherwise silent and Hono-
luluans were isolated from each other by the blackout and the
curfew.
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That we have much, much more to learn in this training school
of war we fully realize. But, if there are any particular recommenda-
tions that we would make, on the basis of our experience, to police
departments of other cities who may sometime be called upon to
face the situation which we faced on December 7, 1941, it would be
these.
1. Recruit, organize, and train an emergency police reserve
from business and professional men in your city. They will
be willing and eager to serve, and if our experience is any
indication, will prove of invaluable assistance.
2. Instruct your civilian populace in advance what to do in
case of such an emergency. Warn them to stay off the streets
and stay off the telephone so that the streets and telephone
lines will be free for emergency workers.
3. Make plans in advance for the speedy clearing and directing
of traffic out of congested areas in case of air raids.
4. Work out detailed plans in advance and inform officers
where to report for assignments and duty during an air raid.
5. Be sure you have an adequate communication system so that
reports can be made to the police by civilians and also that
the police themselves can contact necessary authorities.
6. Train in advance adequate personnel to handle the* increased
burden of administrative duties which the department will
be called upon to handle in an emergency.
7. Make plans in advance for coordinating the activities of
the police and all other civilian defense agencies so that there
is a minimum of wasted energy and overlapping of functions.
Some of these things we did "'before the fact"; but others, as this
report shows, we had to do afterwards.
We have been tried by the ordeal by air. During the attack
many of our men were the targets for machine guns. One officer's
car was riddled with machine gun bullets, but there were no
casualties.
What, you may wonder, do we expect to do in case of the next
test-an enemy landing? We expect and intend to "keep our heads"
and do what we have always done to the best of our ability-protect
the civilian population of Honolulu while the army repels the
invader.
